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A CRANBERRY RECIPE FOR CITIZEN 
RULEMAKING 
Tobias F. Bannon, III* 
Abstract: Under the Massachusetts Clean Water Act, a loophole exists that 
allows fertilizer-laden waters to escape “wet crop” farms and to flow into 
nearby waterways, causing detrimental effects. Blackmore Pond, located 
near Cape Cod, Massachusetts, has seen such effects, and its residents are 
eager for change. Considering that past lawsuits have failed to close the 
wet crop loophole, the residents of Blackmore Pond may petition the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Environmental Protection to amend the Massa-
chusetts Clean Water Act regulations. The Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection may accept the proposed amendments, in 
which case the residents of Blackmore Pond will have achieved success in 
closing the wet crop loophole, or reject the amendments, in which case 
the residents will be able to challenge this decision through judicial review. 
Citizen petitions for rulemaking are a seldom-used, powerful means for 
ordinary citizens to effect change. 
Introduction 
 At the gateway to Cape Cod, Massachusetts, lies Blackmore Pond, a 
forty-six acre “great pond” surrounded by approximately sixty homes.1 
This charming settlement resembles postcard New England: a million-
gallon lake flanked by wooded lots, summer getaways, and year-round 
residences.2 Completing the scene are over one-hundred acres of cran-
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2009–2010. 
1 See Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Great Ponds of Massachusetts According to 
Study by DEP/Waterways Regulation Program 14 (Oct. 17, 2007), available at http:// 
www.mass.gov/dep/water/resources/greatpon.pdf (defining Blackmore Pond as a “great 
pond”); see also Coalition for Buzzards Bay et al., Blackmore Pond Water Quality Improve-
ment Discussion 2 (Feb. 12, 2001) (on file with author); Comments from Barry C. Cos-
grove, Board of Directors, Blackmore Pond Homeowners Ass’n, to Brian Howes & Betsy 
White, Sch. for Marine Sci. and Tech., Univ. of Mass. [hereinafter Comments] (on file with 
author) (correcting some of the information regarding Blackmore Pond). 
2 Applied Envtl. Design & Research, Inc., Blackmore Pond Sanitary Survey and 
Preliminary Ecological Assessment 2 (2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Eco-
logical Assessment]; Comments, supra note 1, at 1; E-mail from Barry Cosgrove, Board 
of Directors, Blackmore Pond Homeowners Association, to Tobias F. Bannon, III, Law 
Student, Boston College Law School (Apr. 16, 2009, 09:46:16 EDT) (on file with author). 
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berry bogs that make things even more picturesque.3 But for some un-
known reason, in the year 2000, Blackmore Pond seemed different.4 
Formerly clear waters took on an uncharacteristically blackish-brown 
hue, causing citizens to worry.5 Homeowners who had previously won-
dered about the water-gulping habits of the nearby cranberry farms 
now suspected that the farms’ activities contributed to Blackmore 
Pond’s mysterious condition.6 
 To investigate the chemistry responsible for the new “muck,” a 
nearby homeowners association commissioned an ecological study of 
the lake.7 The study revealed that the “ink-blobs” and “black globs” 
floating around in the lake were a result of eutrophication, a process in 
which algae grows very rapidly due to high levels of nutrients, particu-
larly phosphorus.8 The ecological study also pointed out that agricul-
tural water such as that from the nearby cranberry bogs—which borrow 
water from Blackmore Pond for “flooding” purposes—can have “a sig-
nificant potential impact on phosphorus levels of receiving waters.”9 
 One might expect that a law exists to prohibit potentially damag-
ing waters from flowing out of a cranberry bog or other farm opera-
tion. For instance, one might assume that the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly known as the Clean Wa-
ter Act (CWA), prohibit farmers from adding pollutants to waterways 
like Blackmore Pond.10 But, as counter-intuitive as it might seem to the 
residents of Blackmore Pond, discharges and runoff from cranberry 
bogs and similar agricultural facilities generally are not regulated under 
the CWA.11 Corresponding state regulations have proven equally inef-
fective at prohibiting the discharge of polluted agricultural runoff be-
cause they have similar loopholes.12 
 This Note explores why the CWA and similar state regulations fre-
quently leave water supplies vulnerable, why past attempts at addressing 
these issues have failed, and proposes a possible avenue for citizens to 
                                                                                                                      
3 Ecological Assessment, supra note 2, at 2. 
4 Jennifer Lade, Cranberry Growers, Homeowners Clash over Pond, Standard Times (New 
Bedford, Mass.), Nov. 9, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081109/NEWS/811090311. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See generally Ecological Assessment, supra note 2 (providing the commissioned 
study’s conclusions). 
8 Id. at 11–12. 
9 Id. at 14. 
10 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
11 See id. § 1342(l )(1). 
12 See, e.g., 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.05(5)–(6), 5.05(9) (2009). 
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initiate appropriate amendments to current regulations. Part I of this 
Note diagrams the architecture and operation of cranberry bogs and 
explains why their discharges are frequently exempted from regula-
tion.13 Part II of this Note explores judicial interpretations of this loop-
hole as well as various methods used to fight the polluting behavior.14 
Part III of this Note explains how citizen petitions for rulemaking pro-
vide a vehicle to address regulatory issues.15 Part IV applies the petition 
process to the situation at Blackmore Pond.16 This Note concludes that 
citizen-initiated petitions for rulemaking open the door to amendment 
as well as judicial review, both of which could close the loophole that 
allows pollution from cranberry bogs and other agricultural facilities to 
continue unabated.17 
I. The Loophole, and Why Cranberry Bogs Fit Through It 
A. Finding the Loop 
 The Massachusetts Division of Water Pollution Control (DWPC) 
has authority over the discharge of ground water and surface water in 
Massachusetts.18 This authority covers both point and nonpoint sources 
of discharge.19 The DWPC and the Massachusetts Clean Waters Act 
(MCWA) define a point source as “any discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, 
tunnel, conduit, well, [or] discrete fissure . . . from which pollutants are 
or may be discharged.”20 Many such features and characteristics are 
common in typical cranberry bogs.21 
 Cranberries grow naturally in wetland environments, and in order 
to imitate those conditions, farmers use a combination of techniques.22 
                                                                                                                      
13 See infra Part I. 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
17 See infra Part V. 
18 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21, §§ 26, 43 (2008); 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.01, 5.01 (2009). 
19 See ch. 21, § 27A; 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.01–.02, 5.01–.02. 
20 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.02, 5.02. 
21 Carolyn DeMoranville & Hilary Sandler, Univ. of Mass. Cranberry Experi-
ment Station, Best Management Practices Guide for Massachusetts Cranberry 
Production: Water Resource Protection and Enhancement 1 (2000), http://www. 
umass.edu/cranberry/downloads/bmp/water_resource_protection.pdf [hereinafter Wa-
ter Resource]. 
22 See Carolyn DeMoranville & Hilary Sandler, Univ. of Mass. Cranberry Ex-
periment Station, Best Management Practices Guide for Massachusetts Cran-
berry Production: Mineral Soil Bog Construction 1 (2000), http://www.umass.edu/ 
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Farmers use water- and organic-confining layers to form the base of the 
bed, and they spread six to eight inches of sand on top of those layers.23 
Once they have properly formed the beds, farmers plant cranberry 
vines, which take several years to reach commercial-grade fruit-bearing 
capacity.24 Once the vines mature, each harvest of cranberry fruit takes 
about sixteen months and can benefit from several man-made floods.25 
Depending on the season and growth of the fruit, this flooding is done 
for different reasons.26 Floods can be used to protect against fall and 
spring frost; to limit exposure to cold, blustery weather in the winter; as 
a natural pesticide; and perhaps most importantly, floods are frequently 
used for harvesting ripe cranberries.27 The wet-harvest technique uses 
floodwater drawn from nearby sources to increase the number of har-
vestable berries.28 The technique is quite efficient because each cran-
berry has several small air bubbles within the fruit, allowing it to float to 
the surface of the water once it is freed from the vine.29 Harvesters then 
gather the floating berries, using special tools to scoop the berries off 
the surface of the water.30 The water is subsequently returned to its 
source when the harvest is complete.31 
                                                                                                                      
cranberry/downloads/bmp/mineral_soil_bog_construction.pdf [hereinafter Bog Con-
struction]; Univ. of Mass. Cranberry Experiment Station, Natural History of the 
American Cranberry Vaccinium macrocarpon Ait. 1–2, http://www.umass.edu/cran- 
berry/downloads/nathist.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Natural History]. 
23 See Bog Construction, supra note 22, at 6 fig.1. 
24 See id. at 5–6; Brent McCown & Eric Zeldin, Vines Versus Transplants for Planting in 
Your Marsh, 1994 Cranberry Sch. Proc., 9, 9, http://www.hort.wisc.edu/cran/pubs_ar- 
chive/proceedings/1994/vinmcc.pdf; Univ. of Me. Coop. Extension, Growing Cran-
berries: Establishing an Upland Cranberry Bed in Maine, www.umaine.edu/umext/ 
cranberries/growing.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
25 Natural History, supra note 22, at 2–3; see also Cape Cod Cranberry Growers’ 
Ass’n, How Cranberries Grow: Water Use, http://www.cranberries.org/cranberries/ 
grow_water.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Water Use] (explaining the many 
types of floods used in cranberry farming). 
26 Natural History, supra note 22, at 2–3; Water Use, supra note 25. 
27 Natural History, supra note 22, at 2–3; Water Use, supra note 25. 
28 See Water Use, supra note 25; E-mail from Dawn Gates-Allen, Communications 
Manager, Cape Cod Cranberry Growers’ Association, to Tobias F. Bannon, III, Law Stu-
dent, Boston College Law School (Mar. 11, 2009, 09:35:50 EDT) (on file with author); see 
also Water Resource, supra note 21, at 1. 
29 Cape Cod Cranberry Growers’ Ass’n, How Cranberries Grow: Fall, http:// 
www.cranberries.org/cranberries/grow_fall.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter 
Fall Cranberries]. 
30 Id. 
31 See Cape Cod Cranberry Growers’ Ass’n, Cranberry Water Use: An Information 
Fact Sheet 1 (2001), http://www.cranberries.org/pdf/wateruse.pdf [hereinafter Water 
Fact Sheet]. 
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 However, floodwaters are not necessary to harvest cranberries.32 In 
fact, farmers have used a dry-harvest method for decades.33 Dry-
harvested berries are valuable for many reasons.34 Because fungi tend 
to grow in damp conditions, dry-harvested berries are more resistant to 
fungus growth.35 Because of this resistance, typically only dry-harvested 
berries can be sold as fresh produce.36 Wet-harvested berries, on the 
other hand, are less resistant to fungi and need to be used more quickly 
than their dry-harvested counterparts.37 Consequently, wet-harvested 
berries tend to be used in juices, sauces, and other situations where 
manufacturers can quickly freeze or process them.38 Dry-harvested ber-
ries fetch higher prices because of their more labor-intensive require-
ments as well as the condition and usability of the fruit.39 Nonetheless, 
the wet-harvest technique is usually used because it results in larger 
yields.40 According to the Cape Cod Cranberry Growers’ Association, 
approximately ninety percent of cranberries are harvested using the 
wet-harvest technique.41 
 To carry out the floods utilized in wet harvesting, dikes—a series of 
barriers designed to contain floodwaters—usually surround cranberry 
beds.42 Aside from regular irrigation sprinklers, the beds are also con-
nected to a nearby large-scale source of water that is tapped for flood-
                                                                                                                      
32 See id. (explaining “wet” and “dry” harvesting techniques). 
33 See Cape Cod Cranberry Growers’ Ass’n, History of Cranberries, http://www. 
cranberries.org/cranberries/history.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). Cranberries are na-
tive to the United States and were first used by Native Americans for food around 1550. 
Flooding was used to control insects and prevent frost damage beginning in 1838, but the 
first successful water harvesting did not occur until sometime in the 1960s. Id. 
34 See Fall Cranberries, supra note 29; see also Gates-Allen, supra note 28; E-mail from 
Hilary Sandler, IPM Specialist, Univ.ersity of Massachusetts. Cranberry Growing Station, to 
Tobias F. Bannon, III, Law Student, Boston College Law School (Mar. 11, 2009 10:23:01 EDT). 
35 Sandler, supra note 34. 
36 Id. 
37 Gates-Allen, supra note 28; Sandler, supra note 34. 
38 See Fall Cranberries, supra note 29; Gates-Allen, supra note 28; Sandler, supra note 34. 
39 Gates-Allen, supra note 28. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See Carolyn DeMoranville & Hilary Sandler, Univ. of Mass. Cranberry Ex-
periment Station, Best Management Practices Guide for Massachusetts Cranberry 
Production: Water Control Structures 2 (2000), http://www.umass.edu/cranberry/ 
downloads/bmp/water_control_structures.pdf [hereinafter Water Control Structures] 
(explaining the best management practices for constructing flumes and dikes for flooding). 
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ing.43 The water travels through a system of flumes, bulkheads, dams, 
and ditches, all of which are designed to let the water flood the beds.44 
 Subsequent procedures vary according to an individual bog far-
mer’s practice and bog configuration.45 “Flow-through” bogs draw wa-
ter from a source, use it, and then return the used water to either the 
original source or another nearby waterway.46 Conversely, bogs that 
employ the more sophisticated “tailwater recovery” systems essentially 
pool the water in reservoirs or retention ponds after its use.47 In those 
ponds, contaminants may settle out of the water before it is returned to 
the source or reused for more flooding.48 Regardless of whether a bog 
is flow-through or uses tailwater recovery, the system used for output of 
water is similar to that for input: a network of pumps, flumes, bulk-
heads, dams, and ditches transports the water back to the source.49 
 Andrew C. Hanson, Attorney Advisor at the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Office of Civil Enforcement, and David C. Bender, 
a practicing environmental attorney, have argued that the CWA defini-
tion of “point source” should cover many portions of the bog-associated 
water transportation system.50 There is even reason to consider the gul-
lies and sediment traps as point sources.51 However, the CWA, the 
MCWA, and most other state-implemented clean water regulations pro-
vide exceptions for agricultural uses.52 In fact, the Massachusetts defini-
tion of point source expressly “does not include return flows from irri-
                                                                                                                      
43 See Ecological Assessment, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining that Eagle Holt cran-
berry bogs withdraw and discharge water from nearby Blackmore Pond at a rate of up to 1 
million gallons per day); see also Water Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 1. 
44 See Water Control Structures, supra note 42, at 1; Water Resource, supra note 
21, at 1. 
45 See Andrew C. Hanson & David C. Bender, Irrigation Return Flow or Discrete Discharge? 
Why Water Pollution from Cranberry Bogs Should Fall Within the Clean Water Act’s NPDES Pro-
gram, 37 Envtl. L. 339, 362–63 (2007). 
46 Id. at 362. 
47 Id. at 362–63. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. at 349, 362–63. 
50 See id. at 349–50, 361–64. 
51 See Hanson & Bender, supra note 45, at 349. 
52 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l )(1) (2006); 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.05(5)–(6), 5.05(9) (2009). 
It is worth noting that unlike in these regulations, in cranberry industry terminology, flood-
waters are distinguished from irrigation water in both speech and practice. See, e.g., Univ. of 
Mass. Cranberry Experiment Station, Best Management Practices: Guides, http:// 
www.umass.edu/cranberry/services/bmp/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) (setting forth a wealth 
of “Best Management Practices,” which clearly draw distinctions between irrigation water and 
floodwater); Water Use, supra note 25 (defining irrigation differently than floods). 
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gated agriculture.”53 Furthermore, the Massachusetts Surface Water 
Discharge Permit Program (SWDPP) exempts “[a ]ny introduction of 
pollutants from nonpoint source agricultural . . . activities including 
runoff from orchards, [and] cultivated crops . . . .”54 Under this defini-
tion, the return flow exemption provides a loophole through which 
pumped, piped, and controlled flows of water from cranberry bogs and 
other agricultural operations can escape into waterways without being 
subject to pollution regulation.55 
 It is worth noting that cranberry bogs were meant to be included 
under the discharge permitting process.56 In July of 1976, the EPA 
amended its then-current irrigation return-flow exemption to require 
permits for “agricultural point sources.”57 An official comment to the 
regulation expressly included water used for cranberry harvesting.58 
However, Congress ingnored this comment in 1977 whne it passed the 
CWA Amendments, granting a sweeping exemption to all irrigation re-
turn flows.59 
 Examining the scientific climate when CWA Amendments were 
written helps explain why Congress decided to allow irrigation return 
flows to pour runoff into local waterways.60 The federal government 
designed the CWA Amendments at a time when little was known about 
the deleterious impacts of nonpoint source runoff.61 The science 
pointed to the visible point sources of pollution as the primary causes 
                                                                                                                      
53 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.02, 5.02. The Massachusetts Ground Water Discharge Per-
mit Program and the Surface Water Discharge Permit Program use nearly identical defini-
tions. Id. For purposes of this Note, the Surface Water Discharge Permit Program will be 
the main focus, because this is the regulation most applicable to cranberry bogs; however, 
both ground and surface water regulations provide the same loophole and could be amended 
using the same process. See supra Parts III–IV. 
54 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.05(5) (emphasis added). 
55 See id.; see also Hanson & Bender, supra note 45, at 349 (pointing out that in spite of 
the discharge from cranberry bogs seeming like point sources of pollution, little has been 
done to subject them to regulation). 
56 Hanson & Bender, supra note 45, at 351. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, 
and Society 633–35 (3d ed. 2004). Additionally, since states that implement their own 
clean water acts usually model them after the federal CWA, the loopholes in those statutes 
are reliant upon the same reasoning that results in the loophole in the federal CWA. Com-
pare 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l )(1) (2006) (exempting irrigation return flows from CWA permit 
requirements), with 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.05(5)–(6) (2009) (exempting agricultural 
runoff and irrigation return flows from permit requirements). 
61 See Plater et al., supra note 60, at 633–35. 
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of water pollution.62 This context set the stage for placing the most 
emphasis on point sources of pollution.63 Additionally, the irrigation 
return flow exemption arose from the government’s attempt to com-
pensate for the wide-ranging climates of our nation.64 Farmers in more 
arid climates would obviously need to water their crops more frequently 
than farmers in damper climates, and the federal government did not 
want to discriminate against the arid-land farmers by subjecting them 
to the same water regulations as the farmers with wetter land.65 To ad-
dress this issue, the Act left open a general exemption for irrigation 
waters that flowed off farmers’ property after agricultural use.66 
Though water from a sprinkler that trickles off of a cornfield in Arizona 
has traveled quite a different pathway than water being pumped from a 
flooded cranberry bog in Massachusetts, hypothetically this sweeping 
return flow exemption applies equally to both scenarios.67 
B. Results of the Loophole 
 The problem with cranberry bogs using water from nearby sources 
remains troublesome, but a look back to Blackmore Pond gives a 
clearer picture. The ecological assessment of Blackmore Pond cited 
four possible sources of the elevated levels of phosphorus: septic sys-
tems, agricultural water, fertilizer, and precipitation.68 Evaluation of the 
data eliminated septic systems from the list of possible causes of the eu-
trophic growth.69 More studies were needed to pinpoint the source.70 A 
2005 study then showed what Blackmore Pond residents had suspected 
for years: the water returning from the nearby cranberry bogs was 
laden with phosphorus.71 The 2005 study also compared several other 
bog operations and found “that flood discharges are the events of con-
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. at 633. 
63 See id. 
64 Hanson & Bender, supra note 45, at 352 & n.94. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 352. 
67 See id. at 348–54 (explaining that the irrigation return flow exemption is very broad 
and that Congress had hoped that local operations would fine-tune regulation of agricul-
tural wastewater). 
68 Ecological Assessment, supra note 2, at 13. 
69 Id. at 15. 
70 Id. at 16. 
71 Carolyn DeMoranville & Brian Howes, Phosphorus Dynamics in Cranberry 
Production Systems: Developing the Information Required for the TMDL Process 
for 303D Water Bodies Receiving Cranberry Bog Discharge 17–53 (2005); see Lade, 
supra note 4. 
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cern for cranberry systems.”72 Even scheduling those floods to try to 
minimize phosphorus levels is challenging; flooding too quickly stirs up 
sediments that can be carried out with the water, but flooding too 
slowly allows more phosphorus to absorb into the water.73 Additionally, 
phosphorus used in previous years’ fertilizing can be picked up and 
washed out with future years’ flooding.74 “[F]lood discharge . . . from 
bog sites is substantially higher in [total phosphate] concentration 
compared to incoming bog waters.”75 Back at Blackmore Pond, the 
residents and researchers saw a strong link between the eutrophic 
growth in 2000 and the discharge from the local cranberry bogs.76 
II. Why the Loophole Has Gotten Stronger 
A. Fighting Irrigation Return Flow 
1. The Logic of the Fight 
 Many parties have fought to close the loophole in the CWA and/or 
their respective state regulations.77 They have done so because closing 
the loophole would force certain types of agricultural discharges, such 
as cranberry bog discharges, into a category governed by point source 
regulation.78 Point sources are regulated by the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) and various state discharge regu-
lations.79 In Massachusetts, the SWDPP and Ground Water Discharge 
Permit Program allow the DWPC to set and enforce limits for pollut-
ants in surface water and groundwater point source discharges.80 If ag-
ricultural discharges were classified as point sources, then the EPA 
and/or state environmental agencies could regulate their pollutant lev-
                                                                                                                      
72 DeMoranville & Howes, supra note 71, at 44. 
73 Id. at 32–33. 
74 Id. at 19–27, 52. 
75 Id. at 44. 
76 Barry Cosgrove, Bd. of Dirs., Blackmore Pond Homeowners Ass’n, History of the 
Blackmore Pond Controversy 5 (2008) (unpublished report on file with author). 
77 See, e.g., Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Env’t, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 
300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); Hiebenthal v. Meduri Farms, 242 F. Supp. 2d 885 (D. Or. 
2002); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 
62 (3d Cir. 1983). 
78 See generally Hanson & Bender, supra note 45 (arguing that if certain types of agricul-
tural waters were not exempted as part of the irrigation return flow exemption, that those 
waters could be regulated). 
79 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(f ) (2006); see also 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.00, 5.00 (2009). 
80 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.03, 3.05, 5.03, 5.05 (requiring all discharges to go through 
the permitting process, but providing exceptions for various nonpoint sources). 
136 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 37:127 
els.81 In theory, these agencies could set standards similar to industrial 
wastewater, water treatment plants, or create entirely different stan-
dards for these types of agricultural discharges.82 Presently, however, 
the lack of regulations means that agricultural users do not have to se-
riously consider their treatment of water resources.83 
 Commentators have pointed out that water leaving a cranberry 
bog is very different from a typical return flow of irrigation.84 One of 
the studies done on the Blackmore Pond system showed that the Eagle 
Holt cranberry bog system—the predominant user of Blackmore Pond 
water for bog flooding—had “no observed surface water discharge ex-
cept during flood releases.”85 In other words, the researchers found 
that most of the time there was no surface water flowing from the bogs 
into Blackmore Pond.86 Even the water used for irrigation during the 
growing season was not detectible as surface water discharge.87 The wa-
ter that is used for the few floods each year is the only measurable sur-
face water return flow from the Eagle Holt system to Blackmore 
Pond.88 
 With the potential of dry-harvesting in mind, citizens wonder why 
discharge from wet-harvested berries—water that was not used during 
the growing season but merely as an alternative harvesting technique— 
fits into the runoff from cultivated crops exclusion.89 If the MCWA de-
fined cranberry bog discharge as a point source or not a return flow of 
irrigation, the DWPC could regulate pollutant levels in these dis-
charges.90 
                                                                                                                      
81 See 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.02–.03, 3.05. If, for example, the term “point source” 
did not have such a sweeping exemption including all “return flows from irrigated agricul-
ture,” or the exemption granted under section 3.05 excluded agricultural water that was 
not used for irrigation, then cranberry bog flood discharge could be regulated. See id. 
82 See id. at 3.06–.19 (illustrating the regulation of various other classifications of dis-
charge water). 
83 See id. at 3.05. 
84 See, e.g., Hanson & Bender, supra note 45, at 356. 
85 DeMoranville & Howes, supra note 71, app. at 74. “Flood releases” include flood-
waters used for harvest and winter protection. See id. at 13. 
86 See id. app. at 74. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 E-mail from Barry Cosgrove, Board of Directors, Blackmore Pond Homeowners Asso-
ciation, to Tobias F. Bannon, III, Law Student, Boston College Law School (Apr. 16, 2009, 
17:28:08 EDT) (on file with author); see also Hanson & Bender, supra note 45, at 347, 364. 
90 314 Mass. Code Regs. 3.02–3.03, 3.05 (2009). 
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2. History of the Fight 
 Although no case history exists with regard to closing the loophole 
for cranberry bog discharge, litigants have fought similar battles.91 The 
most closely related case appears to be Fishermen Against the Destruction of 
the Environment v. Closter Farms.92 In this Eleventh Circuit case, a sugar-
cane farm was actively pumping water into Lake Okeechobee, Flor-
ida.93 The water consisted of storm drainage as well as water used to 
flood and irrigate the sugarcane.94 The court held that the sum of the 
water being pumped off of the premises could be classified as either 
“agricultural stormwater discharge” or “return flow from irrigation ag-
riculture” despite the active pumping mechanisms.95 Discharge for wa-
ter classified as either agricultural stormwater discharge or return flow 
from irrigation agriculture is unregulated; therefore, the water leaving 
Closter Farms was similarly unregulated.96 The court even added that 
“any pollutants that originated within Closter Farms can be discharged 
into Lake Okeechobee by Closter Farms without [a discharge] per-
mit.”97 This statement reinforced the loophole that federal and/or 
state environmental agencies cannot regulate agricultural floodwa-
ters.98 
 Hiebenthal v. Meduri Farms further illustrates the strength of the ir-
rigation return flow loophole.99 Defendants owned two fruit dehydrat-
ing plants in Oregon and used the wastewater from dehydration as irri-
gation for their crops.100 Before using the water for irrigation, 
defendants stored it, allowed it to settle, and treated it; however, even 
after these processes, the court recognized that the water was still pol-
luted.101 The plaintiffs accused the farmers of frequently over-watering 
their crops—possibly to dispose of the excess wastewater easily—and 
claimed that the excess wastewater was more similar to industrial dis-
                                                                                                                      
91 See, e.g., Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Env’t, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 
300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); Hiebenthal v. Meduri Farms, 242 F. Supp. 2d 885 (D. Or. 
2002); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 
62 (3d Cir. 1983). 
92 See 300 F.3d 1294. 
93 Id. at 1296. 
94 Id. at 1297. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1297–98. 
97 See id. 
98 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l )(1) (2006); Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d, at 1297–98. 
99 242 F. Supp. 2d 885 (D. Or. 2002). 
100 Id. at 886. 
101 Id. at 886–87. 
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charge than agricultural discharge.102 The defendants, by dumping 
toxic waters onto crop fields, were essentially evading regulation of 
what would otherwise be industrial wastewater.103 The court held that it 
did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.104 While the 
court recognized that the defendants might frequently apply excess 
amounts of polluted water to their crops and that this water often left 
the fields as runoff, it reiterated the rule that the CWA does not pro-
vide a remedy to the plaintiffs.105 The court stated that in order to have 
jurisdiction, excess runoff must come from a point source.106 Because 
this runoff—even though it began life as industrial wastewater—was 
used to irrigate crops, it was not regulated under the CWA and the 
court had no power to hear such matters.107 
 In contrast, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania held that water discharged from a mushroom composting facility 
was not irrigation return flow.108 The holding in United States v. Frezzo 
Bros., Inc. focused on distinguishing what actually constituted “agricul-
tural” water.109 Even though composting was done on site and then 
some of that compost was used to grow mushrooms at the same site, the 
court held that because the majority of the compost was sold as a 
manufactured commodity, the use of the water in the process of mak-
ing the compost did not constitute an agricultural use.110 At a pretrial 
hearing, the defendants produced two expert witnesses who argued 
that making mushroom compost is an agricultural activity; nonetheless, 
the court held otherwise.111 Utilizing a previous holding regarding the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, the court explained that “mushroom growing 
is a type of farming, [but] the production of mushroom compost is a 
preliminary activity which manufactures a product.”112 This distinction 
meant that the court considered the water used in producing the com-
post to be separate from the agricultural process; consequently, it did 
                                                                                                                      
102 Id. at 888. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 Hiebenthal, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 888. 
106 Id. at 887. 
107 See id. at 887–88. 
108 United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 713, 723 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 703 
F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1983). 
109 Id. at 722–24. 
110 Id. at 724. 
111 Id. at 722, 724. 
112 Id. at 723 (citing Donovan v. Frezzo Bros., 678 F.2d 1166, 1169 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
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not constitute any sort of irrigation return flow.113 This classification 
made the water subject to discharge regulation.114 
B. Alternate Fighting Tactics 
 Because lawsuits attempting to close the loophole in the CWA and 
corresponding state regulations have proven unsuccessful to date, some 
parties have opted to sue under different theories.115 Like Blackmore 
Pond, Musky Bay, Wisconsin, became heavily laden with phosphorus 
during the early 2000s.116 This phosphorus was also suspected to have 
originated from the fertilizers applied to nearby cranberry beds.117 Evi-
dence showed that defendant’s bogs were responsible for forty to fifty 
percent of the phosphorus entering the bay.118 Such high amounts of 
phosphorus caused drastic changes in water clarity as well as plant and 
algae growth.119 The State of Wisconsin accordingly filed a public nui-
sance suit, seeking an injunction to bar the defendant from releasing 
phosphorus into Musky Bay, requiring him to restore the bay, and to pay 
damages to nearby landowners.120 The court recognized that the defen-
dant’s cranberry operation was a factor in the degradation occurring at 
Musky Bay.121 The stumbling block, however, was that there was no way 
to determine whether “the overall scope of the interference . . . [was] a 
public nuisance.”122 Counting the number of days per year that the pub-
lic was interfered with might have given an indication of the condition 
of the lake, but due to the likelihood that other factors contribute to the 
usability of Musky Bay, the court was not comfortable using those calcu-
lations to find the defendant liable.123 With no way of calculating dam-
ages, the court did not impose a penalty on the defendant.124 
 The difficulty of measuring responsibility for public nuisances of-
ten presents plaintiffs with a challenge.125 Even outside the context of a 
                                                                                                                      
113 See id. at 724. 
114 Frezzo Bros., 546 F. Supp. at 725. 
115 See, e.g., State v. Zawistowski, No. 2006AP1539, 2008 WL 302382, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Feb. 5, 2008). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Zawistowski, 2008 WL 302382, at *1. 
122 Id. at *2. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at *5. 
125 See, e.g., id. (showing that even though cranberry bogs were recognized as a large 
contributor to the phosphorus that rendered the bay useless for part of the year, it was the 
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public nuisance suit, placing blame can be difficult.126 For example, 
after previous eutrophic growth incidents on Blackmore Pond, Eagle 
Holt growers blamed the residents of Blackmore Pond.127 Eagle Holt 
claimed septic systems might be responsible for the elevated phospho-
rus levels.128 Although this accusation was later proven false, the claim 
illustrates how challenging it can be to assign liability and recover dam-
ages in a public nuisance action.129 
III. Citizen-initiated Rulemaking 
A. The Rulemaking Process 
 In the context of futile attempts at closing the regulatory loophole 
and seemingly hopeless public nuisance suits, the residents of Black-
more Pond are eager for a creative solution.130 A solution may exist that 
enables the residents to amend regulations under the Massachusetts 
Clean Waters Act to protect what they consider to be their, as well as the 
public’s, interest.131 
 The United States allows citizens to propose adoption, amendment, 
or repeal of federal regulations.132 This powerful tool is also codified in 
many state administrative procedures, allowing citizens to petition for 
the adoption, amendment, or repeal of state and local regulations.133 
The General Laws of Massachusetts, chapter 30A, section 4, permit “any 
interested person [to] petition an agency requesting the adoption, 
amendment or repeal of any regulation.”134 Although Massachusetts law 
is ambiguous, federal law has often held that “person,” as defined by the 
                                                                                                                      
measuring of liability and institution of a penalty that proved to be a difficult—and in this 
case, impossible—task). 
126 See, e.g., Cosgrove, supra note 76, at 2(showing the ease with which blame can be cast). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See id.; see also Ecological Assessment, supra note 2, at 10, 13–16 (discussing how 
septic systems can sometimes contribute to degradation of nearby lake water quality, but 
that the risk of such an occurrence at Blackmore Pond is minimal). 
130 See E-mail from Zygmunt Plater, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, to 
Barry Cosgrove, Member of Blackmore Pond Homeowners Association ( July 11, 2008 
13:43:35 EDT) (on file with author). 
131 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 4 (2008); Lade, supra note 4. 
132 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006). 
133 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 4. 
134 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA), may include groups and organiza-
tions.135 
 The Massachusetts statute also dictates that each government 
agency “shall prescribe by regulation the procedure for the submission, 
consideration and disposition of such petitions.”136 For example, the 
MADEP sets out its own procedure in chapter 310, section 2.00 of the 
Massachusetts Code of Regulations.137 MADEP’s code of regulations 
clearly states that petitions for rulemaking can be addressed to the de-
partment in writing at any time or delivered to the agency in person 
and that “[t]he petition may be accompanied by any supporting data, 
views or arguments.”138 Even though the right to petition for adoption, 
repeal, or amendment of any MADEP regulation is available to any in-
terested party, the petition process at MADEP is very seldom used, indi-
cating that doing so may be a novel approach to attempting to address 
the irrigation return flow loophole.139 
 Once a party submits its petition to MADEP, the agency will then 
consider the petition at a meeting—at which attendees’ comments or 
questions may be permitted—and shall determine whether to schedule 
the petition or recommendation for further proceedings.140 Within ten 
days of the original meeting, the department will notify the petitioner 
of the department’s action.141 
 Provided that MADEP decides to act on the petition, there are 
slightly different procedures for rulemakings that require hearings ver-
sus those that do not.142 Because a public hearing is required for “any 
regulation the violation of which is punishable by fine or imprison-
ment,” and because violation of the MCWA is punishable by fine or im-
prisonment, a public hearing would likely be required for this amend-
                                                                                                                      
135 See id. § 1(4); Zygmunt Plater et al., The State of Alaska’s Power to Petition 
for Federal Rulemaking Under APA § 553(e), at 2 (1989). 
136 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 4. 
137 310 Mass. Code Regs. 2.00 (1994). 
138 Id. at 2.02. 
139 See E-mail from Lin Sasman, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, to Tobias F. Bannon, III, Law Student, Boston College Law School ( Jan. 28, 2009, 
14:39:08 EST) (on file with author) (explaining that MADEP does not have any record of 
citizen petitions for rulemaking ever being used, and that when asked, three employees 
with between twenty-four and thirty-four years of experience at MADEP could not recall 
any recent petitions for rulemaking). 
140 310 Mass. Code Regs. 2.03–.04. 
141 Id. at 2.03. 
142 Compare id at. 2.05 (dismissing public hearing requirement), with id. at 2.06 (requir-
ing a public hearing). 
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ment.143 Preceding the public hearing, MADEP is required to give no-
tice of the hearing at least twenty-one days prior to the scheduled 
date.144 The notice must be published “in at least two newspapers of 
general circulation, and where appropriate, in such trade, industry, or 
professional publications as the agency may select.”145 
 When the time comes for the hearing, “the meeting shall be 
opened, presided over, and adjourned by the Commissioner, or an-
other employee authorized to adopt regulations, or a designee.”146 Al-
though the format of the public hearing is subject to some flexibility, it 
may not take the form of an adjudicatory proceeding.147 “Any inter-
ested person or his duly authorized representative . . . shall be given an 
opportunity to present orally statements and arguments”; however, the 
agency may use its discretion to limit the length of oral presenta-
tions.148 Also, written statements and arguments may be filed with the 
agency within ten days of the close of the public hearing.149 The agency 
is required to consider all relevant material presented to it before 
amending any regulation.150 
B. The Aftermath of the Rulemaking Process 
 Following the hearing, the agency may amend the regulation or 
reject the proposed amendment.151 MADEP’s regulations concerning 
notice of the disposition of the proposed action—the decision to ac-
cept or reject the petition—are silent when it comes to regulations 
where a public hearing is required; however, if the process resembles 
regulations where no public hearing is required, the agency must give 
written notice of the disposition to all persons taking part in the peti-
                                                                                                                      
143 See id. at 2.06; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21, § 42 (2008) (indicating a fine or im-
prisonment may be the penalty for violation of water discharge regulations). 
144 310 Mass. Code Regs. 2.06(1). 
145 Id. The notice shall contain more than just the location and date of the meeting. 
The agency is also required to publish, among other things, the text of the proposed regu-
lation and the agency’s statutory authority to adopt the proposed regulation. Id. 
146 Id. at 2.06(2). 
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148 Id. at 2.06(3). 
149 Id. at 2.06(2). 
150 310 Mass Code Regs. 2.06(2). 
151 See id. at 2.03, 2.08 (explaining that regulations will take effect if and when they are 
filed). Although there is no clear procedure for the rejection of a proposal, section 2.03 
states that the department will notify petitioner within ten days of the department’s action, 
implying that the department will either accept or reject the proposal. See id. at 2.03. 
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tion process.152 As such, the petitioners can expect that the agency will 
notify all parties of its disposition of the proposed action.153 
 One possible outcome of the petition process is that MADEP de-
cides to amend the regulation.154 In this case, the changes shall take 
effect upon filing, unless a later date is specified by the agency in the 
regulation.155 A second possibility is that the agency decides not to 
amend the regulation.156 Although non-adoption might seem like de-
feat to the petitioners, it is not the end of the road.157 
 Following an agency decision not to amend the given regulation, 
there are still a number of possible grounds for petitioners to suc-
ceed.158 The fact receipt of a petition requires public notice means that 
the proposal will be in the public eye.159 Furthermore, especially when 
a public hearing is involved, media attention may be captured.160 One 
possible result of this attention is that state and local politicians may 
become aware of and involved with the issues raised by the petition.161 
Then, regardless of whether or not the petition proceeds smoothly 
through the regulatory process, the politician may instigate rulemaking 
by exerting force in the political process.162 In 2001, for example, Mas-
sachusetts Acting Governor Jane Swift sought to reduce emissions from 
the commonwealth’s dirtiest power plants.163 “The filthy five,” as they 
were called, were six power plants responsible for ninety percent of to-
tal pollution generated by all of the commonwealth’s power plants.164 
The Clean Air Now coalition had originally filed a petition with 
                                                                                                                      
152 Id. at 2.05(2). Most of the processes of non-hearing procedures are analogous to 
hearing-required procedures. In light of this, one can presume that where the post-
hearing notification process of regulations that require a hearing is silent, it would be ana-
logous the post-submission period process of regulations that do not require hearings. See 
id. at 2.05–.06. 
153 See id. at 2.05(2), 2.06(2). 
154 See id. at 2.06. 
155 Id. at 2.08. 
156 310 Mass. Code Regs. 2.06, 2.08; see also Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to 
Regulate, 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 179, 192–95 (2005) (discussing various outcomes of 
unsuccessful petitions for rulemaking). 
157 See Morriss et al., supra note 156, at 192–95. 
158 See id. 
159 Id. at 192. 
160 See id. 
161 Id. 
162 See id.; see also Frank Phillips & Beth Daley, Swift Seen Seeking Cuts in Emissions: Regu-
lations to Crack Down on Power Plants, Boston Globe, Apr. 21, 2001, at A1. 
163 Phillips & Daley, supra note 162. 
164 See id. 
144 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 37:127 
MADEP in 2000 seeking to amend emissions regulations.165 MADEP 
granted a hearing to petitioners, and received over 1200 pages of writ-
ten comments and heard over twenty-five hours of oral testimony.166 In 
2001, under pressure from Governor Swift, MADEP amended power 
plant emissions regulations, setting limits on sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides, carbon dioxide, and mercury.167 The entire process took years; 
MADEP officially issued new regulations on June 7, 2002. Despite the 
delay, Clean Air Now considered the campaign a success.168 
 If the petition process fails, another option for pursuing amend-
ment is judicial review.169 During the petition process, the comment 
period helps establish the record for judicial review.170 MADEP must 
address all comments received during the comment period, forcing the 
agency to pay attention to industry and public concerns.171 Addressing 
the comments also results in agencies being held accountable for con-
sidering and addressing the issues raised in the comments.172 During 
judicial review, a court may examine the agency response data.173 
 In Massachusetts, petitioners can file for judicial review of any 
regulation.174 Judicial review opens up the possibility of declaratory re-
lief, but the burdens for obtaining such relief are high.175 Historically, 
the courts have made it clear that they will defer to the agencies.176 If 
petitioners simply show facts to support their amendment, they will not 
                                                                                                                      
165 Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Appendix A: Response to Comments: 310 CMR 7.29, at 24 
(2001), available at http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/laws/finalrtc.doc; E-mail from Rob Sar-
gent, Energy Program Director, Environment America, to Tobias F. Bannon, III, Law Stu-
dent, Boston College Law School (Mar. 24, 2009, 12:53:58 EDT) (on file with author). 
166 Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Waste Prevention, Div. of Planning & 
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169 See Morriss et al., supra note 156, at 193–95. 
170 See id. at 192. 
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173 See id. at 195. 
174 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 7 (2008). 
175 Id. at ch. 231A, §§ 1–2 (explaining the power of declaratory judgments); see, e.g., 
Borden, Inc. v. Comm’r Pub. Health, 448 N.E.2d 367, 378 (Mass. 1983); Purity Supreme, 
Inc. v. Att’y General, 407 N.E.2d 297, 306 (1980) 
176 Borden, 448 N.E.2d at 378; Purity Supreme, Inc. 407 N.E.2d at 306. 
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meet the burden of proof required to amend the regulation.177 Instead, 
petitioners will have to show “the absence of any conceivable ground 
upon which [the rule] may be upheld.”178 Here, agency responses to 
public comment may be useful.179 Because the court looks for “reason-
ableness, not rightness” in supporting the agency’s position, the peti-
tioners must strive to show that the agency’s grounds are unreason-
able.180 If the petitioners are successful in doing so, they may obtain 
declaratory relief.181 
 At the national level—as seen in the Supreme Court case Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council—judicial review generally 
takes two steps: in the first, courts question whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.182 If yes, then both the 
court and agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed in-
tent of Congress.”183 In other words, if Congress has spoken, the agency 
is not free to make its own interpretation of the statute; it must follow 
the directives of Congress.184 On the other hand, if Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue—if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue—then the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.185 In Chevron, for example, the Court of Ap-
peals had held that the EPA’s “bubble” concept—a means of grouping 
stationary source emissions by overall emissions at a given property 
rather than at each specific smokestack—was “inappropriate” for 
achieving the Clean Air Act’s goals of improving air quality.186 Revers-
ing this holding, the Supreme Court pointed out that even if a court 
felt that the statute should have been interpreted differently, the court 
                                                                                                                      
177 See id. 
178 See id. (citing Borden, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 448 N.E.2d 367, 378 (Mass. 
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179 See Morriss et al., supra note 156, at 192 & n.67. 
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183 Id. at 843. 
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may not substitute its own construction for a “reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.”187 Furthermore, the Court 
repeatedly stressed the importance of deference to the agency, espe-
cially when statutes are vague or leave room for interpretation.188 
 Despite high levels of deference, courts will hold that an agency’s 
action is unreasonable if that action directly contradicts the face value 
of the regulation in question.189 In United States Gypsum Co. v. Executive 
Office of Environmental Affairs, for example, the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court held that an official’s exclusion of certain properties from a spe-
cific type of zoning was “unsupported by substantial evidence” because 
the properties undoubtedly fit criteria clearly defined in agency regula-
tions that would have included those properties as part of the zon-
ing.190 Furthermore, the court expressly stated that “courts will not 
hesitate to overrule agency interpretations of rules when those inter-
pretations are arbitrary, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the plain 
terms of the rule itself.”191 The court explained that in most cases, 
though, an agency’s reasonable interpretation will be “entitled to great 
weight.”192 
 If petitioners do not meet success through petition, public and 
political attention, and judicial review at the state level, they can essen-
tially repeat the entire process at the federal level.193 The CWA includes 
similar irrigation return-flow exemptions that result in loopholes for 
cranberry bogs.194 Because state-specific clean water acts must be at 
least as strict as the CWA, if this loophole were closed at the federal 
level, it would need to be closed at the state level as well.195 As such, citi-
zens or citizen groups could use the APA to submit a petition to amend 
the federal CWA.196 This process would provide another opportunity 
for petitioners to propose amendment, catch public attention, and file 
for judicial review if necessary.197 
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IV. Using Citizen Petitions for Amendment to  
Close the Loophole 
A. Petitioning for Amendment 
 The CWA’s irrigation return-flow exemption results in loopholes 
that many consider to be illogical and a nuisance to the public.198 The 
residents of Blackmore Pond are particularly affected by the loophole, 
and they, as well as the water quality of the lake, would benefit from its 
closing.199 Although a lawsuit against the growers is one possible option 
for the residents, such suits are generally unsuccessful.200 As such, a citi-
zen petition for rulemaking—in this case, amendment of a regulation— 
may provide an unexpected avenue of addressing the problem.201 This 
seldom-utilized procedure would allow any one citizen or group of citi-
zens, such as a homeowners association, to petition MADEP to amend 
the ground and surface water discharge permit programs.202 
 To begin the petition process, the homeowners association would 
need to petition MADEP by proposing an amendment to the MCWA 
regulations.203 For example, the association might seek to amend title 
314 of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, section 3.05(6).204 The 
regulation currently excludes “[r]eturn flows from irrigated agricul-
ture” from pollution permit regulation.205 The association might peti-
tion to amend subsection 3.05(6) to read “return flows from irrigated 
agriculture, but not including non-irrigation agricultural waters.”206 Such a 
                                                                                                                      
198 See generally Hanson & Bender, supra note 45; Lade, supra note 4. 
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change in regulation would mean that waters used by farmers for pur-
poses other than irrigation would be subject to discharge regulations.207 
This modification can be seen as a modest compromise: the irrigation 
return-flow exemption is left intact because true return flows from irri-
gation can remain unregulated, but agricultural waters not used for 
irrigation must go through the discharge permitting process.208 As a 
result, water that trickles off of fields after sprinklers are used to water 
the crops would remain untouched by the amendment, but water that 
is piped and pumped onto bogs and then returned to the source after 
collecting the harvest would fall into a category requiring permits for 
discharge.209 
 Upon submitting the petition for amendment, the association 
would want to also submit relevant information supporting their peti-
tion.210 The agency guidelines do not suggest what sort of materials 
should be submitted, but in order to build as strong a case as possible, 
the petitioners would want to submit relevant “data, views [and] argu-
ments.”211 Submitting the scientific studies would demonstrate that 
phosphorus is the cause of the eutrophic growth and that the cran-
berry bogs, not septic tanks, are the most troublesome contributor of 
phosphorus.212 By explaining the water patterns, the water study could 
help support the notion that flood releases are the major cause of 
phosphorus leaving the bogs and entering the lake, thereby pinpoint-
ing the source of the problem.213 Photographic evidence could illus-
trate the effects of the eutrophic growth, both at different times of the 
year and in the past several years.214 Documentation of the fact that ir-
rigation return-flow exemptions were meant to protect actual irrigation 
done by farmers in dry climates could support the argument that water 
leaving the cranberry bog should not fit into the “irrigation return 
                                                                                                                      
207 See id. at 3.03, 3.05. 
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214 See Ecological Assessment, supra note 2, at 1 (indicating that lake conditions 
have changed with time). 
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flow” category.215 Ultimately, beneficial material could include anything 
that the homeowners association believes will help support their 
case.216 
 Following the submission of the petition to amend the MCWA 
regulations, MADEP would decide at a meeting whether to schedule the 
petition for further proceedings; it would notify the association within 
ten days of the decision.217 If the agency decides to proceed, then this 
procedure would likely occur by the public hearing method, because 
violation of the ground and surface water discharge permit programs 
are punishable by fine or imprisonment.218 The public would be noti-
fied of the hearing through at least two local newspapers, and the 
agency might also choose to notify local cranberry growers through in-
dustry publications.219 In the interim, all interested parties would be 
able to submit written statements and arguments, and could continue 
doing so until ten days after the public hearing.220 The greater the 
number of well-reasoned statements and arguments submitted to 
MADEP, as well as the number of parties who attend and participate at 
the public hearing, the greater the impact on MADEP in terms of ap-
preciating the significance of this issue.221 The homeowners association 
would want to encourage as many submissions and attendees as possible. 
 Following the public hearing, the agency may or may not amend 
the regulation.222 If MADEP amends the regulation as proposed, the 
homeowners association would obviously be delighted, and as soon as 
                                                                                                                      
215 See Hanson & Bender, supra note 45, at 352. 
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MADEP files the amendment (or at a date specified by the agency), 
cranberry bogs would need to meet specified criteria for discharges of 
non-irrigation agricultural waters.223 The cranberry bog floodwaters 
could then be regulated under the MCWA.224 The amendment pro-
posed by the homeowners would remove non-irrigation agricultural 
waters from the exemption category, which would open the door to 
limitations on nearly all types of pollution.225 MADEP could enforce 
phosphorus limitations to minimize or avoid future eutrophic growth, 
and the cranberry farmers would then have a choice: either stop using 
the water or abide by MADEP’s permitting and regulation process.226 
Even if Eagle Holt were to choose dry harvesting, if they were to exe-
cute floods throughout the growing season—for instance, for winter 
weather protection purposes—then this water would also have to meet 
discharge regulations upon release because it is non-irrigation agricul-
tural water.227 
 If MADEP does not amend the regulation, or if MADEP decides 
not to proceed upon receipt of the original petition, then the home-
owners association might want to begin the process of judicial review.228 
Judicial review provides an avenue to amend regulations, but the bur-
den of proof is high.229 It is possible that the court would look to Chev-
ron for guidance and would thus consider whether the intent of Con-
gress is clear in this particular regulation, and if not, whether the 
agency’s construction of the regulation is permissible.230 Based on the 
fickle mid-1970s discharge regulations, as well as the struggles seen in 
modern case history, the homeowners association can likely show that 
legislative intent is not clear in terms of whether non-irrigation agricul-
tural runoff is meant to fit through the irrigation return flow loop-
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hole.231 Still, the subsequent level of deference to the agency would be 
high, and the association would need to prove that the agency’s choice 
to enforce the regulation is unreasonable, not that it is “not right.”232 
 On one hand, the court might analogize to Chevron.233 Even if the 
court might have interpreted the statute differently, provided that the 
agency’s interpretation is one form of reasonable interpretation, the 
court will not provide a remedy.234 However, it is possible that the court 
could find that MADEP’s interpretation of the Act is “arbitrary, unrea-
sonable, or inconsistent with the plain terms of the rule itself.”235 For 
instance, the court might look to the intent behind the 1976 permitting 
regulations and note that return flows from cranberry bogs were meant 
to be regulated before Congress passed the sweeping irrigation return 
flow exemption in the 1977 Clean Water Act Amendments.236 Using 
this history as guidance, and by considering agency responses to public 
concerns raised during the petition’s comment period, the court might 
hold that it is unreasonable to permit controlled releases of non-
irrigation agricultural waters under the return flow exemption.237 
B. The Relevance of Case History in the Petition Process 
 Upon submitting the petition to MADEP, appealing to prior case 
history might also help the homeowners association.238 Because it is 
almost impossible to find consistent, established precedent with regard 
to irrigation return flow matters, it is obvious that clarifying the defini-
tion of “irrigation return flow” would be beneficial.239 
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 Frezzo Bros. is perhaps the only case where the court felt comfort-
able enough to make a distinction between various types of waters used 
at one agricultural operation.240 Pointing out that some water coming 
off of a farm is very different than what regulations seek to exempt, the 
court ruled that the runoff resulting from mushroom composting must 
be subject to discharge regulation.241 In essence, the court drew a line 
between traditional farming activities and other activities that may take 
place on a farm.242 Runoff from traditional farming activities was more 
likely to be classified as an exemption.243 In this case, the court held 
that composting water, because it was used primarily to manufacture a 
commodity for sale, could be subject to discharge pollution regulation; 
the irrigation, rain, and runoff water, however, was exempt as irrigation 
return flow.244 In sum, Frezzo Bros. seems to indicate that certain proc-
esses that take place on a farm—in this case, manufacturing—do not fit 
through a loophole in the irrigation return-flow exemption.245 
 The holding in Frezzo Bros. was subsequently weakened when the 
court in Hiebenthal held that it had no authority over excess manufac-
turing wastewater disposed of on crop fields.246 The court even men-
tioned that the water was polluted and that such discharge is likely to 
continue.247 In spite of such conditions, the court held that it did not 
have subject-matter jurisdiction over the waters in question.248 Hieben-
thal thus illustrates a mismatch between common sense and written law: 
polluted waters running off of a crop field should be regulated, but be-
cause there exists a general irrigation return-flow exemption, the court 
is powerless.249 Furthermore, Hiebenthal does not support the holding 
in Frezzo Bros. that manufacturing wastewater is subject to CWA regula-
tion.250 
 If non-irrigation agricultural waters were regulated under the 
CWA, then perhaps the Hiebenthal court would not have had to give up 
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so easily and the holding would fit more squarely with Frezzo Bros.251 
The Hiebenthal court instead could have been able to make a distinc-
tion: the water that was sufficient for irrigating the crops could fit into 
the “irrigation return flow” exemption and flow naturally without per-
mit, but the excess water that was intentionally applied for disposal 
purposes is not irrigation and therefore must meet certain water quality 
standards upon discharge.252 A regulation that stated such a distinction 
might have been easier for the court to enforce and possibly could have 
resulted in less of a struggle.253 
 Frezzo Bros. and Hiebenthal are proof that clarity in the CWA is 
needed; when the holdings from the cases are compared, it is difficult 
to see a consistent application of the irrigation return flow exemp-
tion.254 It would have been possible for the Hiebenthal court to follow 
the precedent set in Frezzo Bros. and demand that excess manufacturing 
wastewater be subject to CWA regulation, but instead, the court held 
otherwise.255 Even though the water was polluted, the court held that it 
did not have jurisdiction under the CWA.256 Closing the non-irrigation 
agricultural waters loophole would solve this problem and enable more 
consistent regulation of the various types of agricultural waters.257 
C. The Aftermath of the Petition Process: Modern Solutions to Old Problems 
 The courts could have decided differently or more efficiently in 
many of the cases mentioned if the irrigation return flow loophole did 
not exist.258 These cases also give an indicator as to how cranberry bogs 
might be regulated in light of a CWA amendment.259 For example, al-
though the court in Frezzo Bros. might not have decided differently, it 
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probably could have made its finding much more efficiently.260 Rather 
than having to turn to prior case law to determine if manufacturing was 
classified as part of agricultural activity, the court could have simply 
placed the water into the “non-irrigation agricultural waters” category 
and enforced CWA regulation accordingly.261 By analogizing cranberry 
production to the farming practices in Frezzo Bros., one can distinguish 
between water used to help the cranberries grow and water used to col-
lect a marketable commodity.262 Noting that it is possible to harvest 
cranberries without flooding the beds, cranberry farmers clearly use 
the floodwaters for the wet-harvesting method to procure a commodity 
for sale; therefore, like water used to manufacture compost, it is not 
agricultural irrigation.263 
 The Hiebenthal scenario is also analogous to the situation at Black-
more Pond because the cranberry floodwaters are similar to the excess 
manufacturing wastewater coming off of the fields in Hiebenthal.264 In 
neither situation is the water that creates the controversial “return flow” 
used to irrigate crops; in the former the water is used to harvest, in the 
latter it is left-over manufacturing wastewater applied in excess of irriga-
tional needs.265 It would have been possible for the farmer in Hiebenthal 
to use less water when irrigating his crops.266 Similarly, cranberry farm-
ers can harvest their crops without using any floodwaters at all.267 Thus, 
like the court in Hiebenthal would have had jurisdiction over the excess 
waters if the non-irrigation agricultural waters loophole were closed, 
the MADEP could regulate the water from Eagle Holt cranberry bogs 
returning to Blackmore Pond if the loophole were closed.268 
 Finally, Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Environment represents 
perhaps the broadest interpretation of the agricultural water return 
flow loophole, and it is important to distinguish the case from modern-
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day cranberry operations.269 In Fishermen, the court held that discharge 
of the floodwaters from a sugarcane field was stormwater and irrigation 
return flow and thus exempted from regulation.270 During sugarcane 
growth, the fields stay flooded throughout the growing season, and 
much of the floodwater is actually used to water the crops as they 
grow.271 As such, closing the non-irrigation loophole might allow pro-
portionate regulation of the volume of water that is not used to irrigate 
the sugarcane, but leave unregulated the volume of water used to actu-
ally irrigate the crops.272 This situation is very different from that seen 
on most cranberry bogs.273 Whereas the floodwater on the sugarcane 
fields is actually used to irrigate growing crops, the cranberry floodwa-
ters are utilized for other purposes.274 As seen in the water pattern 
study at Blackmore Pond, the only surface water measured leaving the 
bogs was after a flood release, not during the regular growing season.275 
This finding supports the argument that the water is not actually any 
sort of return flow from irrigation; after all, true irrigation would have 
been done during the growing season, but the researches did not ob-
serve any water leaving the bog at that point in time.276 Rather, the wa-
ter that is normally discharged during flood releases is more of a tool 
that farmers use to harvest the berries at the end of the growing sea-
son.277 If the homeowners association were successful at closing the 
loophole via amendment to the MCWA, the designation of these waters 
would no longer be a guessing game; as non-irrigation agricultural wa-
ters, they would be subject to regulation.278 
Conclusion 
 The residents of Blackmore Pond would benefit from an amend-
ment adding “non-irrigation agricultural waters” to the list of regulated 
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discharges under the MCWA.279 In fact, many environmental interest 
groups as well as the general public might also benefit from a similar 
amendment at the federal and/or state levels.280 Data shows that cran-
berry bogs are, in fact, a known source of phosphorus in surrounding 
waterways, and that such phosphorus can result in eutrophic growth, 
an undesirable condition that decreases water quality and usability.281 
Furthermore, case history shows two things: attempts at dealing with 
these problems have been largely unsuccessful and that courts are often 
uncertain and inconsistent when applying CWA regulations to various 
types of agricultural waters.282 
 It is therefore evident that clarification of the discharge regula-
tions is needed and that upon such clarification, it would be beneficial 
to include an amendment closing the irrigation return-flow exemption 
loophole that permits farmers to discharge non-irrigation agricultural 
waters without regulation.283 Fortunately, Massachusetts state law allows 
any citizen to petition for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any 
state or agency regulation.284 The Blackmore Pond Homeowners Asso-
ciation could use this valuable tool to propose amendment to the 
MCWA regulations.285 If successful, the amendment could impose wa-
ter quality regulations on the discharge of cranberry bog waters and 
other non-irrigation agricultural waters not only into Blackmore Pond, 
but other state waterways as well.286 
 If the state-level petition process does not yield favorable results for 
the association, the homeowners may utilize judicial review and attempt 
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to prove that the respective regulation under the MCWA is unclear and 
unreasonable.287 Additionally, the homeowners may also commence a 
very similar petition process at the federal level seeking to amend the 
federal CWA.288 Finally, it is important to note that citizen petitions for 
rulemaking at both the federal and state levels are very valuable— 
though often overlooked—tools for any American seeking change. 
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